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Introduction
In the Postscript to The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Thomas Kuhn famously argued that there is 'no neutral algorithm for theory choice' in science. Kuhn allowed that scientists might have good reasons for choosing one theory over its rivals, citing 'accuracy, simplicity, fruitfulness and so on' as examples of such reasons, but he insisted that they fall short of providing an algorithm (Kuhn 1969 p. 199) . Even if two scientists agree on the features that a good theory should have, they will not necessarily be led to make the same choices, Kuhn argued, for they may weight the features differently. For example, the two scientists might agree that accuracy and simplicity are both important theoretical virtues, but disagree about their relative importance, and thus be led to choose different theories. Neither can be called irrational, Kuhn insisted, and neither was necessarily acting unscientifically.
The idea that there is no algorithm for theory choice met with a favourable response from Kuhn's critics, even among those unsympathetic to other aspects of his consistency, scope, simplicity, and fruitfulness (Kuhn 1977a, p. 321) . These five, he says, are 'the standard criteria for evaluating the adequacy of a theory', widely agreed on by mainstream philosophers of science. Kuhn has no quarrel with the standard view that these criteria play a key role in scientific theory choice; indeed, he regards them as partially constitutive of what science is. However he argues, using examples from the history of science, that the criteria fail to uniquely determine theory choice, for two reasons. Firstly, the criteria are ambiguous-it may be unclear which of two theories is simpler, for example. In some respects Copernicus' theory was simpler than Ptolemy's, Kuhn says, but in others it was not. Secondly, there is the problem of how to appropriately weight the criteria, when they pull in different directions. How should simplicity be traded off against accuracy and scope, for example? Kuhn says that 'no progress' has been made towards solving this problem (Kuhn 1977a, p. 329) .
It is this second problem-weighting-that will be the focus of our attention here, so the first problem-ambiguity-will be ignored. In any case, the first problem arguably collapses into the second. Consider Kuhn's own example. He says that Copernicus's theory was simpler than Ptolemy's in that it invoked more parsimonious mathematics, but was no simpler in that the computational labour required to predict planetary positions was the same for both. If this is correct, then simplicity, in this example, needs to be sub-divided into two criteria: mathematical parsimony and computational ease, neither of which is ambiguous. Of course, this raises the question of how the two types of simplicity should be weighted, which is more important, etc.
But that is just an instance of the second problem. It seems, therefore, that the ambiguity of Kuhn's five criteria provides no principled reason to doubt the existence of an algorithm for theory choice. Disambiguation can always be carried out by subdividing an ambiguous criterion, though this exacerbates the weighting problem. So the latter is more fundamental.
Suppose it is true that there is no algorithm for theory choice. What follows?
The conclusion Kuhn drew is that value judgements play an inevitable role in theory choice, and thus that the ideal of 'objectivity', as that notion was understood by traditional philosophers of science, is unattainable. This does not mean that theory 4 choice is irrational, Kuhn stressed, or that 'anything goes', but rather that the traditional conception of rationality is too demanding. Two scientists, on the basis of the same empirical evidence, could arrive at different theories without either of them being irrational, Kuhn argues. So the 'no algorithm' argument does not undermine the rationality of science, he thinks, but rather forces us to a more realistic conception of what rational theory choice is like. Whether or not we accept this, Kuhn is surely right that the 'no algorithm' argument has important epistemological consequences.
Importantly, when Kuhn says there is no algorithm for theory choice, he means that there is no unique algorithm. His point is that given the five criteriasimplicity, accuracy, fruitfulness etc.-which all parties agree form the shared basis for theory choice, there are many conceivable algorithms that one could construct, and no obvious way of choosing between them. (Thus Kuhn talks about 'the algorithms of different individuals' in a scientific community, while insisting that there is no such thing as 'the algorithm of objective choice' (Kuhn 1977a, p. 328) .) So the problem is that there are too many algorithms for theory choice, each perfectly acceptable, and no way of singling out the 'right' one. This is why Kuhn sometimes expresses his thesis by saying there is no neutral algorithm for theory choice (Kuhn 1969, p. 199) .
My point in stressing this is that there is another, quite different thing that might be meant by saying there is 'no algorithm' for theory choice. One might mean that there is no acceptable algorithm at all, not that there are too many. It might be the case that there is no way of constructing an algorithm, based on the five criteria, which meets minimal standards of acceptability. But this is not Kuhn's claim. Rather, he thinks that there are many acceptable algorithms, each of which weights the five criteria differently, and each as rationally defensible as each other.
Another way to capture the distinction is this. Kuhn will presumably agree that there are certain minimal standards which any acceptable algorithm for theory choice must meet. For example, if theory T 1 scores higher than T 2 on each of his five criteria, then an algorithm that selects T 2 over T 1 is obviously unacceptable-no rational scientist could use it. So these minimal standards, whatever exactly they are, enable us to rule out some possible algorithms for theory choice. But on Kuhn's view, many algorithms will still remain-and there is no way of narrowing down the choice to a single one. An alternative view, however, is that no algorithms at all will remain, after those that fail to meet the minimal standards have been discarded. These are 5 quite different views, and are mutually incompatible, though each might be expressed by saying that there is 'no algorithm' for theory choice.
The distinction between these two views might be thought inconsequential, for both imply that there is no unique algorithm for theory choice, though for different reasons. And if Kuhn is right that the notion of rationality of traditional philosophy of science presumes the existence of a unique algorithm, then there is a threat to that notion in either case. This may be so; but it is still surely important to know why there is no unique algorithm for theory choice, if there isn't. Is it because there are many acceptable algorithms and no good way of choosing between them, or because there are no acceptable algorithms? The epistemological consequences might be similar in either case, but the distinction is a real one and will play an important role in what follows.
The idea that theory choice is based on multiple criteria, which may pull in different directions, is not unique to Kuhn's philosophy of science. Rather, it is common to diverse philosophical views on how scientific inference works. For example, proponents of 'inference to the best explanation' cite multiple factors, such as simplicity, unifying power, and scope, which enter into the assessment of how good a candidate explanation is (Thagard 1978 , Lipton 1990 . Bayesians argue that the choice between rival theories depends on how well they score on two different criteria-prior probability and likelihood-which can conflict (Howson and Urbach 1992, Earman 1992) .F 3 F Finally, proponents of 'statistical model selection' argue that the choice between rival hypotheses again depends on two factors-fit-with-the-data and simplicity-which typically do pull in different directions (Forster and Sober 1994, Forster 2001) . So the issues to be discussed below have a relevance that extends beyond an assessment of Kuhn's 'no algorithm' thesis.
Social choice theory and Arrow's impossibility theorem
Social choice theory deals with the problem of aggregating individuals' preferences, over a set of alternatives, into a single 'social preference'. For example, suppose a given society has four alternatives: building a school, a hospital, an airport, or a cinema, only one of which can be chosen. Each individual in society is assumed to have a weak preference order over the alternatives, that is, a ranking of the 6 alternatives from best to worst, with ties permitted. Formally, a weak preference order is a binary relation that is transitive, reflexive and complete. The preference order of the i th individual will be denoted R i , so 'xR i y' means that the i th individual weakly prefers alternative x to alternative y, that is, she doesn't strictly prefer y to x. From the weak preference relation R i , we can define a corresponding relation of strict preference P i , and of indifference I i .F
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Suppose that for each of the n individuals in society, we know their preference order over the four alternatives. We can encode all this information in a single profile, denoted <R 1,  , R n >, which is simply a list, or vector, of preference orders, one for each individual. An example of a profile is contained in Table 1 below. Given this information, we would then like to be able to construct a single social preference order R, which ranks the four alternatives in terms of how good they are 'for society as a whole'.F 5 F On any reasonable ethical view, the social preference order should depend somehow on the preference orders of the individuals in society, but how It might be objected that for some criteria of theory choice, the binary relation will not be complete. Take for example scope. Plausibly, one might take a theory's 'scope' to be its total set of logical consequences, and the relation 'T 1 has at least as much scope as T 2 ' to mean that T 2 's consequence class is a subset of T 1 's. But this relation, though reflexive and transitive, need not be complete, for the consequence classes of a pair of theories may be non-nested, that is, the theories may be noncomparable for scope. Though this is a valid point, 'scope' is arguably the only one of Kuhn's five criteria that it affects. (In the case of simplicity, for example, it is plausible that for any two theories, either one is simpler than the other or they are 10 equally simple, i.e. 'is at least as simple as' is complete.) So the completeness assumption can be justified as a reasonable idealization. After all the assumption that individuals' preference relations are complete is also an idealization.F 8 The next step is to consider a 'theory choice rule', defined by direct analogy with an Arrovian social choice rule. Given a profile of weak orders, one for each criterion of theory choice, a theory choice rule yields a single ordering of the alternative theories. So for example, suppose we have four alternative theories, and three criteria: simplicity, accuracy and scope. By assumption, we know how to rankorder the theories by each criterion. We feed this information into the theory choice rule, which then outputs an 'overall' ranking of the theories, from best to worst.
Formally, the theory choice rule is defined in exactly the same way as Arrow's social choice rule.
Next, let us ask whether Arrow's four conditions apply to the theory choice rule. Condition U (unrestricted domain) seems unexceptionable-however the theories are ranked by the various criteria, the rule must be able to yield an overall ranking. There should be no a priori restriction on the permissible rankings that are fed into the rule. Such a restriction might make sense if there is an intrinsic trade-off (or correlation) between two of the criteria. For example, if greater simplicity always involves a sacrifice of accuracy, then the simplicity rank-ordering will be the inverse of the accuracy rank-ordering. This will rule out some possible inputs to the rule, which implies a natural domain restriction. But unless we have specific reason to think such trade-offs must always obtain, condition U seems reasonable.
Condition P (weak Pareto) seems undeniable. If theory T 1 does better than theory T 2 by each of Kuhn's criteria, that is, it is simpler and more accurate and more fruitful etc., then it must surely be preferred overall. This seems as obvious as its analogue for social choice. What about condition N (non-dictatorship)? It says that there is no one criterion such that if T 1 is ranked above T 2 by that criterion, then T 1 is 11 automatically above T 2 in the overall ranking. This condition makes good sense, so long as we agree that all the criteria are relevant to theory choice. Violation of the condition would mean that one criterion, for example simplicity, was regarded as so important that a less simple theory would never be preferred to a more simple one, however highly it scored on the other criteria.
What about condition I (independence of irrelevant alternatives)? It says that the overall ranking of T 1 and T 2 should depend only on how the criteria rank T 1 and T 2 , not on how they rank other theories. So for example, suppose we have three criteria, simplicity, accuracy and scope, and two theories. Suppose T 1 is simpler than T 2 , T 2 is more accurate than T 1 , and T 1 has greater scope than T 2 . Condition I says that this is all the information that is relevant to the overall ranking of T 1 versus T 2 ; so if in this case the theory choice rule ranks T 1 above T 2 (for example), then it must rank T 1 above T 2 in every relevantly similar case, that is, every case where T 1 is simpler than T 2 , T 2 more accurate than T 1 , and T 1 greater in scope than T 2 . As with the social choice rule, this condition has strong intuitive appeal, capturing the idea that rational theory choice shouldn't depend on irrelevant factors.
If we agree that U, P, N and I are conditions on reasonable theory choice, then it is obvious that an Arrovian impossibility result applies. So long as there are at least three alternative theories, there exists no theory choice rule that satisfies all four conditions. This spells bad news for the possibility of making 'rational' theory choices.
One might naturally express this impossibility result by saying that there can be 'no algorithm' for rational theory choice. This sounds similar to what Kuhn said, but recall the discussion of section 2. As we saw, Kuhn meant that there is no unique algorithm; he argued that the multiple criteria for theory choice could be combined into a decision rule in many ways, and there is no good way of choosing between them. So the problem according to Kuhn is that there are too many algorithms. But the Arrow impossibility result implies the opposite-there is no algorithm for theory choice that meets reasonable conditions. When Kuhn saw an embarrassment of riches, Arrow tells us that there is nothing at all. Both Kuhn's view and the Arrow-inspired view imply, obviously, that there is no single algorithm for theory choice, over three or more alternatives, which is rationally acceptable. This conclusion conflicts with the traditional ideal of rationality, associated with Carnap, according to which two rational agents with the same 'total evidence' must end up in the same epistemic state. In the context of theory choice, the But if the Arrovian view is right, then neither of these options holds any promise, and our epistemological predicament is correspondingly more serious. Put differently, Kuhn makes rational theory choice look difficult, at least if we cleave to a certain conception of rationality, but Arrow makes it look outright impossible.
Possible escape routes
Since the Arrow-style impossibility result threatens the rationality of theory choice, Another possibility for reconciling Arrow with Kuhn is simply to reject one or more of Arrow's conditions. Kuhn was sceptical (in some moods) about the existence of 'trans-paradigmatic' criteria of rationality, which are universally binding on scientists across all eras; perhaps he would argue that an acceptable algorithm for rational theory choice need not respect Arrow's conditions? This option does not seem especially plausible, given the intuitiveness of those conditions, but one possible argument against condition N (non-dictatorship) is worth briefly discussing.
In the context of theory choice, condition N says that no criterion can be a dictator, that is, can be such that whenever x ranks above y by that criterion, then x ranks above y overall. However, a strong empiricist might well hold that the criterion of 'fit-with-the-data' should be a dictator. Empiricists in philosophy of science have long argued that criteria such as simplicity are of lesser importance than fit-with-thedata, and should only be invoked, if at all, where the data cannot decide between two others are only valuable in so far as they are reliable indicators of accuracy. So from an empiricist perspective, not all of Kuhn's criteria are equal.
Importantly, dictatorship of 'accuracy' (or 'fit-with-the-data') need not mean that the other criteria play no role at all in theory choice. For recall the definition of a dictator: a criterion (or individual) whose strict preference for x over y always leads x to be ranked higher than y overall. By contrast, a strong dictator is a criterion (or individual) whose preference for x over y, strict or weak, always becomes the overall preference. A strong dictatorship of 'fit with the data' would be an extreme form of empiricism-that refused to invoke extra-empirical criteria of theory choice even to break ties between pairs of theories that fit the data equally well. But an ordinary (not strong) dictatorship of 'fit with the data' could use criteria such as simplicity to break ties, that is, to settle cases where the dictator is indifferent. This is known as a 'serial'
or 'lexicographic' dictatorship, and represents a more moderate form of empiricism.
Accepting a serial dictatorship of 'fit with the data' is in principle a way out of the impossibility result, since this theory choice rule does satisfy conditions I, P, and U. However, even if one accepts the underlying empiricist motivation, there are two problems with this solution. Firstly, to make it work, a complete lexicographic hierarchy of all the criteria of theory choice must be established, that is, a specification of the order in which they should be applied, to break ties. If there are only two criteria, for example fit-with-the-data and simplicity, then this is not a problem, but if there are more than two, there is a problem. For it is quite unclear how the hierarchy should be generated. Should simplicity or scope be invoked first, when fit-with-the-data cannot separate a pair of theories? Secondly and more importantly, a dictatorship of 'fit with the data', even serial, seems unattractive when we take account of the fact that our data invariably contain 'noise'. If our data were noise-free, always preferring a theory that fitted the data better would make sense. But with noisy data, perfect fit is not always desirable, as emphasised in the model-selection literature (Forster and Sober 1994) . This 'problem of over-fitting', as it is known, constitutes a strong reason not to relax condition N in the manner mooted above, even if we are empiricists. and anyway there is no guarantee that the resulting domain restriction would be of the right sort to alleviate the Arrovian impossibility.
Sen's 'informational basis' approach
I turn now to what is arguably the most attractive 'escape route' from Arrow, namely Amartya Sen's idea of using an 'enriched informational basis' (Sen 1970 (Sen , 1977 A third possible escape route is to relax condition I, a move defended by some authors, e.g. Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2008) , in the context of choosing allocations for an economy. However it seems unlikely that the rationale for relaxing I, in such contexts, transposes to the context of theory choice discussed here. Next, Sen introduces the concept of a social welfare functional (SWFL). This is a function that takes as input a profile of utility functions, and yields as output a social ranking of the alternatives. A SWFL is analogous to an Arrovian social choice rule, in that both yield the same output; however, the former takes a profile of utility functions, rather than preference orders, as input. Potentially, this allows more information to be taken into account.
Analogues of Arrow's four conditions can now be imposed on the SWFL. The analogue of U says that the domain of the SWFL is the set of all possible profiles of utility functions, that is, individuals can have whatever utility functions they please.
The analogue of P says that if everyone gets more utility in alternative x than in y, then x is socially preferred to y. The analogue of N says that there can be no individual such that whenever they get more utility from x than y, then x is socially preferred to y. The analogue of I, known as 'independence of irrelevant utilities', says that the social preference between x and y must depend only on individuals' utilities in 12 Sen's approach has been further developed by numerous workers; for good overviews see Gaertner 2006 , Roemer 1997 , and Bossert and Weymark 2004 x and y. These conditions on the SWFL will be denoted U′, P′, I′ and N′; they are motivated by arguments similar to those that motivate the Arrovian originals. Numerous alternatives to Arrow's ONC condition are now possible. They include: cardinal-scale utility with no comparability (CNC); cardinal-scale utility with full comparability (CFC); ratio-scale utility with full comparability (RFC); ratioscale utility with no comparability (RNC); and absolute-scale utility with full comparability (AFC). In effect, each of these conditions partitions the set of all profiles of utility functions into equivalence classes of 'informationally equivalent' profiles, and requires that the SWFL yield the same social ranking for all the profiles in a given equivalence class. ONC is the strongest condition-for the classes of profiles that it treats as informationally equivalent are very large, and thus the restriction on the SWFL considerable. By contrast, AFC is the weakest condition-it places each profile into a singleton class of its own, which implies no restriction on the SWFL. This illustrates a general moral: the richer the informational basis, that is, the finer the partition of the profiles into equivalence classes, the weaker the resulting condition on the SWFL. Kelsey 1987 , namely that the functions used in an SWFL need not necessarily be interpreted as utility functions. 19 The SOS of a hypothesis is the sum of the squared distance of each data point from the hypothesis's prediction.
21 also be ratio-scale measurable. Therefore, the real-valued 'utility' function that represents the 'fit-with-the-data' preference order will be ratio-scaled, thus multiplication by a positive constant is the only information-preserving transformation. Statements such as 'T 1 fits the data three times as well as T 2 ' will be meaningful.
To take another example of how we can often go beyond ordinal information, consider simplicity. In certain contexts, such as statistical model selection, the simplicity of a hypothesis is taken to be the number of free parameters it contains.
Thus for example, the hypothesis 'y = ax + b' is simpler than 'y = ax 2 + bx + c' because the former contains two free parameters, the latter three. So in this case, simplicity is measured on an absolute scale-the actual numbers are meaningful, so only the identity transformation preserves information. Similarly, in a Bayesian context, a prior probability distribution over a set of hypotheses is a case of absolute measurability-the actual numbers assigned are meaningful. So in both these cases,
we have much more than ordinal information.
This suggests that the question of what measurement scales are appropriate, for criteria of theory choice, does not have a simple answer. Different scales may be appropriate for different criteria, and may depend on the inferential techniques that we are using. It may be that for the 'large scale' theory choices that Kuhn was interested in, ordinal comparisons are all that can be achieved. But it seems clear that in other, more humdrum cases, particularly where the problem may be formulated statistically, we may have much more than ordinal information at our disposal.
Finally, note that the situation for theory choice is more complicated than for social choice. In social choice, one normally assumes a single type of measurement scale for all utility functions. It would make little sense to suggest that individual 1's utility function was ordinal, individual 2's cardinal. But the analogous situation for theory choice makes good sense. It might well be that fruitfulness, for example, is merely ordinal but that fit-with-the-data is ratio-scale measurable.
What about inter-criterion comparisons, the analogue of interpersonal comparisons? One might think that such comparisons are unlikely. Take for example the statement: 'the difference in simplicity between T 1 and T 2 exceeds the difference in accuracy between T 3 and T 4 '. It is hard to see what the basis for such a judgement might be. It is harder still to see how comparisons of levels, rather than differences, could be made-this would permit statements such as 'the accuracy of T 1 is less than the simplicity of T 2 ', which sound even odder. Since inter-criterion comparability is needed to avoid the impossibility result, as we know, the prospects for escaping the Arrovian predicament by enriching the informational basis of theory choice may seem dim.
However this is overly pessimistic, for two reasons. Arrovian impossibility so long as all 'utilities' are non-negative. Ratio-scale measurability is fairly plausible in certain inferential contexts. Consider 'scope', for example. If differences in scope can be compared, and if in addition there is a natural zero point, that is, it makes sense to talk about a theory with zero scope, then scope is ratio-scale measurable. This does not seem altogether implausible, for some criteria in some inferential contexts. If both scope and accuracy (say) are ratio-scale measurable, each with their own scale, then this permits a limited form of inter-criterion comparability: percentage increases in scope may be compared with percentage increases in accuracy. (So statements such as 'T 1 has 10% less scope than T 2 , but is 15% more accurate' can be made.) As regards point (ii), the restriction to nonnegative 'utilities' seems unproblematic; if 'scope' has a natural zero point, why demand that the theory choice functional be able to deal with profiles in which some theories (per impossible) have negative scope? So there is a potential escape route from Arrow here too.
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To sum up, Sen's work, transposed to the theory choice case, tells us that there do exist theory choice functionals that satisfy Arrow's four conditions, so long as the ONC condition is replaced in favour of one that permits inter-criterion comparison.
This prompts the question of what replacement of ONC (if any) is appropriate, that is, which profiles of 'utility' functions should be treated as informationally equivalent.
There is no simple answer to this question. However, in some cases absolute measurement will be appropriate, implying that ONC should be replaced with AFC;
this permits the impossibility result to be avoided. In other cases ratio-scale measurement will be appropriate, which also permits the impossibility result to be avoided. The general moral is that enriching the informational basis of theory choice does permit an escape from Arrow; though which enrichments are defensible must be answered on a case-by-case basis.
Where does this leave us vis-à-vis Kuhn's 'no algorithm' thesis? If we can escape the Arrovian predicament by enlarging the informational basis, as described above, we will end up with many theory choice functionals that meet our reasonableness constraints. For replacing ONC with an alternative condition (such as AFC), while retaining Arrow's four conditions, does not narrow down the class of permissible theory choice functionals to a single one. So we escape Arrow's predicament only to enter Kuhn's: many acceptable algorithms, and no way to select between them. To escape both predicaments, we need reasonableness conditions that are satisfied by exactly one algorithm. In the social choice literature, researchers have managed to identify conditions that uniquely pick out particular social welfare functionals, such as the utilitarian SWFL, Rawlsian maximin, and others; but it is doubtful whether the analogues of these conditions, transposed to the theory choice case, would be defensible. (By contrast, the analogues of Arrow's conditions are certainly defensible.) Therefore in the theory choice case, escaping Arrovian impossibility by enriching the informational basis seems to lead us straight to Kuhn's 'no algorithm' thesis.
Illustrations: Bayesianism and statistical model selection
The previous section's main conclusion-that Sen's escape route from Arrow does apply to theory choice-can be illustrated by considering the orthodox Bayesian approach to scientific inference. Suppose we have a body of evidence E, and five rival hypotheses {T 1 ,  , T 5 } that are pair-wise exclusive. On the Bayesian view, we use 24 two criteria to choose between the hypotheses: prior probability P(T i ), and likelihood, P(E/T i ). (Likelihood can be thought of as a measure of the 'fit' between evidence and hypothesis, prior probability a measure of the antecedent plausibility of a hypothesis, before the evidence.) Clearly, there are many possible ways of combining these two criteria into a decision rule; but Bayesians argue that the right way to do it is to multiply the prior by the likelihood, that is, to consider the quantity [P(T i ) x P(E/T i )].
The theory with the highest value of this quantity is the most deserving of our credence, according to Bayesians; and more generally, this quantity can be used to generate an overall ranking of the theories, from best to worst.
Bayesians have some sophisticated arguments for why this is the right way to combine the two criteria, but they need not detain us. For the moment, we want to relate Bayesianism to our foregoing discussion. To do this, simply think of P(T i ) and P(E/T i ) as 'utility' functions, both of which assign a real number to each of the five theories. The ordered pair < P(T i ), P(E/T i )> is then a profile, corresponding to a profile of utility functions in a two-person society, in Sen's framework. Now consider the function which maps the set of profiles onto the ranking generated by the quantity higher prior and a higher likelihood than theory T 2 , that is, P(T 1 ) > P(T 2 ) and P(E/T 1 )
> P(E/T 2 ), then T 1 will obviously be ranked higher than T 2 by the BCF. Condition I′, the independence of irrelevant 'utilities' condition, is also satisfied: whether T 1 or T 2 is ranked higher by the BCF is entirely determined by the priors and likelihoods of those two theories; no other information is relevant. Finally, condition N′, nondictatorship, is also satisfied. Neither criterion (prior or likelihood) is able to dictate over the other-it is not true that if T 1 has a higher prior than T 2 then it must be ranked higher, and similarly for likelihood. condition; on the contrary, it is quite possible to have two profiles < P(T i ), P(E/T i )> and < Q(T i ), Q(E/T i )>, where the two prior functions P(T i ) and Q(T i ) rank the theories identically, and the two likelihood functions P(E/T i ) and Q(E/T i ) also rank them identically, and yet the overall rankings, generated by the BCF, are different in the two cases.
This prompts the question: which measurability/comparability assumption is appropriate for the Bayesian theory choice functional? Since probabilities are measured on an absolute scale, the answer is clear: absolute full comparability (AFC).
Given a profile < P(T i ), P(E/T i )>, applying any transformation to it other than the identity transformation will alter its informational content-for the actual probability numbers are meaningful.F Again, the point of this is not to defend the Akaike criterion in particular, but rather to illustrate how Sen's moral-that enriching the informational basis can avoid
Arrovian impossibility-applies to theory choice. The information we feed as input into the Akaike choice functional is far more than merely ordinal, which explains why it satisfies the Arrovian conditions (other than U′). Of course there are many alternative functionals, besides Akaike's, that will also satisfy those conditions, so again, escaping the Arrovian predicament may land us in the Kuhnian one. However, there are also arguments for why the Akaike criterion is the uniquely 'correct' one; so it may be that both predicaments can be avoided. A proper assessment of this issue cannot be undertaken here.
Conclusion
Although Kuhn's 'no algorithm' thesis is quite widely accepted in philosophy of science, there have been few attempts to subject it to serious scrutiny. To remedy this situation, I have used the machinery of social choice theory, and tried to relate Kuhn's thesis to Arrow's famous impossibility theorem. Though superficially similar to Kuhn's, Arrow's conclusion that there is 'no algorithm' for social choice is in fact quite different. For Kuhn's claim is that there are many algorithms, all equally acceptable, while Arrow's claim is that no algorithms meet minimum standards of acceptability.
By identifying Kuhn's five criteria with Arrow's individuals, the theory choice problem was seen to have the same structure as a standard social choice problem.
Moreover, Arrow's four conditions seem as defensible for theory choice as they are for social choice, which raises the spectre of an Arrovian impossibility result for theory choice. Such a result would constitute a refutation of Kuhn's thesis, but would also pose a threat for the rationality of science; a threat that if anything is more worrying than that posed by Kuhn. 
Appendix
Consider a finite set X of pair-wise exclusive theories {T 1,  , T n }. We assume X is a partition of logical space. We wish to show that there is no function f: T→Y satisfying the conditions P′, I′, N′ and ONC.
We show firstly that there is no function g: R→Y satisfying the conditions P′, I′, N′ and ONC.
24 Taking X to be a partition makes the second half of the proof easier, as it allows us to assume that ∑ u 1 (T i ) = 1 as opposed to merely ∑ u 1 (T i ) ≤ 1, but could easily be relaxed.
